This article comments a recent article by M. Flinders on the Problem with Democracy, recently published in this journal, with two main aims. The first is to identify some indicators that can be used to assess comparatively the significance of some of the seven problems identified by the author. Then, having classified the latter in three main streams, the article focuses on two of them, which I call respectively the 'representative linkage' and 'governance mechanisms'. My argument is that the health of democracy is related to complex balancing acts, whose dynamics emerge in a long-term perspective, which allows some myths of 'golden ages' to be identified.
In a recent article published in this journal, Flinders (2016) identifies seven main problems of democracy. While Flinders' article has clearly a comparative thrust, several of the examples used by him involve Britain (understandably so, given that the article is based on the inaugural lecture of the British Library's Enduring Ideas series). The core of Flinders' arguments is built upon his book Defending politics (2012), whose Italian edition I have edited and presented to the Italian public in 2014. As I argue in my presentation (Baldini, 2014a) , Flinders catches the substance of democracy's problems (in plural!). I concur with the greatest majority of his arguments, and in particular with the idea that it is not possible to expel the 'politics' component from any given 'democracy'. And that 'democratic politics' , being based on different and competing views and interests, is deemed to be unsatisfactory for some people, while satisfying others.
This article has two aims. The first is to identify some indicators that can be used to assess comparatively the significance of some of the seven problems, which I classify along three main streams. Operationalising the problems of democracy is no easy task, and what follows aims to see the extent to which the challenges faced by Britain today are also typical of wider trends affecting other European democracies (see also Baldini, 2015) . While Flinders' examples travel across advanced democracies, some of the most influential works on the alleged crisis of democracy (on which see Merkel, 2014 ) have a peculiar British flavour: the country's comparatively high economic inequalities, combined with the low level of electoral participation and the power-hoarding nature of its institutions (starting from the plurality electoral system), mean that Britain is seen as particularly affected by multiple institutional crises (Richards et al., 2014) . More in general, some of the most influential works on the critical status of democracy today are replete with examples from Britain, the most eminent case in point being Colin Crouch's book on post-democracy (2004) .
Having identified three main streams under which to classify the seven problems analysed by Flinders, my second aim is to focus on two of them, which I call, respectively, the 'representative linkage' and 'governance mechanisms', which are then further examined in Section 2. My argument is that the health of democracy is based on complex balancing acts, whose dynamics emerge in a long-term perspective, which allows some myths of 'golden ages' to be identified. In discussing this, I refer to some of the most relevant literature on political parties and democracy, starting from the last (posthumous) work of Mair (2013) . In this, I also aim to be a bit provocative and to raise some non-standard views on how to interpret standard indicators such as electoral volatility and turnout, and to identify the dilemmas that parties face-in this age of distrust-between State, markets and international commitments.
1. Democracy's problems and mythical golden ages: assessing the evidence on the representative linkage The seven problems identified by Flinders can be grouped-with some approximation-along two main streams of challenges (A, B,) and one stream of solutions (C, see Table 1 ). These involve, respectively: representative democracy, and the chain of democratic linkage provided by political parties and by mechanisms of participation and responsiveness (problems no. 1-2 and 5 -6); and the increasing relevance of 'governance' mechanisms (located by Flinders under the twin challenge of technocracy and de-politicisation, problems 3-4 below, my stream B). I define them, respectively, the 'representative linkage' and 'governance mechanisms' , indeed two central questions in democracy today (see Dalton et al., 2011 for a comparative view; and Judge, 2014 for an assessment of Britain's current democratic incongruities). Finally, the remedies that can be put forward in order to defeat political illiteracy (problem n. 7 closes up the list on a more prescriptive No data yet on any possible increased awareness of political problems in electoral campaign
Source: Own elaboration on problems identified by Flinders (2016) .
note, on engaging the public on a new way of imagining politics, stream C) are not covered here. This is mainly because of the intrinsic complexity of this issue, which would deserve an entirely separate article. As another recent article published in this journal suggests in analysing the increasing importance of political disappointment, one strategy to counter this problem 'might be to boost levels of political knowledge; the more that people understand about politics, the lower their expectations appear to be and thus the less likely they are to experience disappointment. However, raising levels of political awareness and understanding across a population is a difficult and long-run task' (Seyd, 2016, p. 16) . Although necessarily briefly, Table 1 indicates some of the means by which to assess the significance of these problems, how peculiar Britain traditionally is, and whether any sign of change can be detected as a consequence of the 2015 British General Election. As far as the first two problems are concerned, quantitative indicators show Britain being in line with other democracies in Europe. Electoral turnout is decreasing almost everywhere, the exception being the Scandinavian countries (see IDEA's database, www.idea.int). However, as the 2015 Danish General Election confirms, Scandinavia is not immune from the rise of populist parties, now spreading pretty much everywhere (including Germany where Volksparteien still hold considerable popular confidence). When one digs deeper, some British peculiarities emerge in both problems. Hence, I shall briefly comment here on two of the three problems in which Britain appears peculiar: the rise of abstentionism especially among the youth (Sloam, 2013) and the rise of UKIP (I shall come back to market madness in the next section). As Flinders argues, in Britain 'if you are young or poor you are far less likely to vote than if you are older or wealthy ' (2016, p. 5) . It is notoriously difficult to investigate the determinants of abstentionism: people who do not bother to vote might just lie in opinion polls or do not bother to be interviewed at all by the pollsters. Be that as it may, Table 2 shows the extent to which non-voting among the youth is peculiarly spread in Britain.
Preliminary research on the 2015 General Election suggests a significant increase in participation in the 18 -24 age group-from 52 per cent in 2010 to 58 per cent (Sloam, 2015) . However, these are just preliminary data from a single Ashcroft poll and further investigations are in order. For instance, Ipsos Mori has very different data, with as low as 43 per cent turnout in the same age group, with a slight increase in the generational turnout gap since 2010.
1 As far as the rise of UKIP is concerned, the interesting point is the capacity that this party has had in pushing the Conservative Party down to the road of the EU membership referendum. While the desire to avoid internal dissent as experienced during the Major government can also have played a role, one can suppose that Cameron's Party has also been 'pushed' to promise a referendum on EU membership-back in January 2013-also by the rise of UKIP in opinion polls all along 2012. In Sartori's terms, UKIP has a very low coalition potential (also because of the penalising dynamics of the plurality electoral system) but a rather strong blackmail potential (Sartori, 2005) . The interesting question to be monitored in the near future regards UKIP's capacity to influence the debate on the forthcoming EU referendum, which might have important consequences for Europe as a whole. The relevance of these first two problems can be further tested comparatively by updating the work of Webb (2002) . Indeed, the rise of abstentionism and of challenger parties are two sides of the same coin, two elements that are traditionally considered crucial sub-components of the representative linkage. In this respect, Table 3 analyses the state of the party systems and the (quantitative) relevance of the main challenger parties in the same European polities analysed by Webb 15 years ago.
The last four columns of the table identify the change taking place over the last 15 years, which appears to have been more consistent in Southern Europe (although Greece is not included, this is clearly the case in Italy with the Five-Star Movement gaining 25 per cent in the 2013 General Election, and potentially Spain, where the rise of Podemos poses a potential seismic challenge in the forthcoming 2015 Spanish General Election). How do we interpret these data? The table looks at the situation at around 2000, by putting a number (1, 0, 21) after each of the first seven columns. The countries can be divided in three groups-experiencing at the time, respectively, a high, medium or low degree of systemic change-and parties born (or significantly increased) since then are also mentioned. Two main comments can be made here, the first on the implications of the rise of populism, the second on how to interpret change over time. To begin with, I concur with Flinders when he mentions that populist parties can sometimes also have 'corrective' effects on the quality of democracy (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2013) . For this to happen, however, there are a series of necessary prerequisites, starting from the fact that new parties should not be exclusionary in their ideology and should be able to integrate ideas and interests of marginalised sections of the electorate into the political agenda (ibid.). While in its first two years in the Italian parliament the Five Star Movement has fallen short of many of its objectives of reforming Italian politics and society via direct democracy (Corbetta and Vignati, 2015) , the most interesting case to follow in the next months is the case of Podemos in Spain. More generally, however, what is still missing in the burgeoning literature on this topic (which I have reviewed in Baldini, 2014b) , is a focus on mechanisms, on how and why populist leaders/parties/styles come about and succeed in certain contexts and not in others. Admittedly a huge task, given the uncertainty that still surrounds the concept of populism, and yet a key task as well if we are to make sense of the relation between populism and democracy.
The second point regards a question that has rarely appeared in research on party politics. In reviewing Mair's book, Maurizio Ferrera refers to the 'myth' of the golden age of party government when 'political parties could effectively have a double role, succeeding at the same time in listening to 'voice' (in English in the original Italian version), cultivate loyalty and correct the distortions of the market without undermining its functioning-consistently with Wolfgang Streeck's laudatio temporis acti ' (2015, pp. 384-385) . Similarly, though from a different perspective, Wolfgang Merkel contends that 'it is . . . an empirically unfounded myth that there was a golden age of democracy in the 1950s or 1960s ' (2014, p. 23) . In reviewing the same book, Jan-Werner Müller makes another interesting point: 'Voting has become more volatile, and although we can't be sure what voters are thinking, it's plausible to assume that taking politics less seriously translates into experimenting more freely with one's ballot. That said, rising volatility could also indicate the opposite: that citizens think more carefully about their choices; that they don't blindly follow a party allegiance they may well have inherited from their parents '. (2014, p. 35) . While Dassonneville and Hooghe have recently found the rise of volatility to be linked to the economic crisis (2015), these authors do not consider individual level voting motives.
Combined, these two points suggest a final consideration on the 'representative linkage'. The decline of political parties-despite some cautionary notes from authoritative authors (Dalton et al., 2011) -is the talk of the town in most democratic countries. However, the 'declinist' interpretation needs to be qualified. The decline of electoral turnout can indeed be a worrying sign for the state of democracy.
But abstentionism is also a complex factor, behind which various attitudes and behaviours can hide. Indeed, recent comparative research on the relation between satisfaction with democracy and electoral participation has challenged the traditional argument of a better quality of democracy being always correlated with high electoral turnout (Ezrow and Xezonakis, 2016) . And yet, Flinders is right in seeing the British situation as particularly worrying: when those who abstain are the most marginal citizens, and when there is evidence that if young voters learn not to vote, they are then likely to remain abstainers in the future (Judge, 2014) , abstentionism is a problem. This is not necessarily the case-or at least not in the same terms-when decline of participation is due to other factors, such as a foretold victory that might not enthuse voters in going to the polls (e.g. Blair in 2001), in a country that still retains the peculiarity-at least in European perspective-of holding elections on a working day.
Balancing acts: the responsiveness/responsibility dilemma, partitocracy and market madness
According to Mair (2013) , over the last three decades political parties have increasingly been affected by a tension between responsiveness and responsibility, between the need to comply to long-term commitments and pressures coming from international markets and organisations and the need to respond to short-term demands of the voters (Bardi et al., 2014) . People have lost confidence in political parties, which have progressively 'cartelized' (Katz and Mair, 1995) . Parties have on one side given a symbolic say to party members via 'plebiscitary incentives' (Mair also coined the expression 'partyless democracy' with regard to Blair's leadership), but then they have to prioritise responsibility over responsiveness, thus opening a gap for the success of populist parties.
However, as already mentioned, this mythic golden age of parties coincided with a period (the so-called 'trente glorieuses') in which the expansion of public spending exposed the State to predatory rule by all-powerful and un-accountable political parties, the two most prominent cases in point being Italy (Cotta and Isernia, 1996) and Belgium (De Winter and Dumont, 2006 ; for a comparison between the two countries, see Deschouwer et al., 1996) . Hence, following Ferrera again, 'the following 'party retreat' lamented by Mair can also be seen under another perspective: in terms of causes, as a result of dynamics which are also endogen (partitocratic degenerations, before cartelisation took place); and in terms of effects, as a development which has at least partly reclaimed politics from mass clientelism and rent-seeking forms of administration ' (2015, p. 385) .
The same idea of judging positively the loss of influence and 'weight' by political parties in society might be difficult to conceive from a British perspective. After all, Britain is the country where party government was first born and whose party system was famously regarded as a beacon of stability from the American Political Science Association, back in 1950. In another publication co-edited by Mair (Kopecky et al., 2012) , Flinders shows Britain to be a textbook case of separation between civil service and government (Flinders and Matthews, 2012) . Indeed, in the index of party patronage, Britain ends up on the opposite side to Italy, Austria and Greece (Belgium not being included in the analysis). While patronage is not to be confused with either clientelism or corruption, the borders between the three concepts are often porous. The Greek case is an interesting case in point. The country is an outlier both in the quantitative index of patronage (+0.28 on the European average as assessed in 15 countries) and qualitatively, with a disproportionate prevalence of the reward-oriented form of patronageassociated with electoral purposes-over the control-oriented, associated with organisational resources. The key point is again caught by Ferrera: 'while Mair saw a strong link between party and society as a key precondition and as a cement for representative democracy . . . this is an open question ' (2015, p. 385) .
This point is important because it shifts the all discussion on stream 2 to a different perspective. There are clearly some instances in which the marketisation of politics is a dangerous element and the same can be said about the rise of unelected technocrats. And yet, again the question becomes one of the right balancing act, both between State and market and between supra-national constraints coming from the European Union and national sovereignty. Hence, I would subscribe to Flinders' position when, after quoting Crick on 'democracy ([which] should act) as a counterweight to the market' says that it is 'possible that any sense of balance has been lost ' (2016, p. 7) . In this respect, however, the balance can also be lost when political parties can get hold of state apparatuses and resources by denying any space to market mechanisms. As Pappas puts it, The crisis in Greece has been the outcome of its particular system of populist democracy-that is, a democracy in which both the party in office and its main rival are populist. As noted above, two mechanisms made this system endure for nearly three decades. The first was a state intent on distributing political rents as widely as possible; the second was a party system ensuring the widespread delivery of state benefits via party rotation in office. With two strong populist parties regularly alternating in power and being in control of a generous state keen to distribute political rents, voters learned that the state was up for grabs and that it was better to associate with the state through party contacts rather than venture into the market through competition. (Pappas 2013, p. 42) While I have reservations on the use of the concept of 'populist democracy' (Baldini, 2014b) , I think this quotation captures the key point about the place of parties between markets and the State, well before the recent escalation on the Greek crisis in Summer 2015. There is clearly no single 'one size fits all' model when analysing this key problem today in Europe that helps to explain why austerity has worked in some countries while not in others (Ricolfi, 2015) . Context matters and the European situation is far from black and white. In this respect, Flinders seems to follow the pessimistic line-if I may call it like that-envisaged by the Mair-Streeck argument on the state of democracy in Europe today. One by which the alleged 'privatisation of government' (much more claimed than empirically assessed) brings about the death of democracy. This debate needs to consider that market madness may indeed be bad for democracy, but cartel parties (or 'Stateparties') have made-and indeed are still making in some of the countries mentioned in this section-no less damage to democracy. While Greece is admittedly an extreme case, and the individuation of responsibilities and blame in the recent crisis go well beyond the scopes of this article, the Italian partitocracy has been 'rescued' by Europe in the mid-1990s (Ferrera and Gualmini, 2004) . All this points to the crucial dilemmas that political parties face in holding the balance between responsiveness and responsibility-especially in these times of ongoing economic crisis and political uncertainty in the EU.
Conclusion: democratic problems, democratic change
The analysis I have conducted here has built upon Flinders' article to explore the meaning of the current problems of democracy. My comments chime with Corbett's (2016) suggestions that democracy and the current wave of anti-politics need to be contextualised cross-time and cross-space. Indeed, I also suggested (Baldini, 2014a ) that Flinders' book (2012) should better be read in parallel with David Runciman's book (2013) , also referred to by Corbett, and which reminds us that 'you cannot have the good of democratic progress without the bad of democratic drift ' (2013, p. XV) .
In this article, I have assessed empirically some of the problems put forward by Flinders. As I have argued elsewhere (2015), Britain is not facing a crisis of democracy as some British political scientists are fond of claiming. The country is less exceptional than some of the most pessimistic analyses argue. However, there are some peculiarities which can contribute to assess the validity of Flinders' arguments. In what I called the representative linkage Britain mainly suffers from youth's disengagement from politics, while in governance mechanism the often debated question involves the marketisation of politics in the most neo-liberal European economy. Flinders captures the substance of democratic problems affecting not just Britain, but many European countries more in general, and the European Union as well. He also correctly identifies the risks in moving too much in the direction of the market and in the proliferation of agencies, boards and commissions, respectively. I have argued that the question of the right balancing act becomes relevant when looking at the opposite risks of relying too much on the State, like 'partitocracies' do, as also particularly harmful for the health of democracy. By referring to golden ages and balancing acts, I have focused on some indicators and political dilemmas that might be useful in future analysis on the current explosion of a critical literature on the state of democracy and representative politics more in general, whose last product to date is an interesting volume by Tormey (2015) .
